



Washington D.C. 20505

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7 NOV 1984

Major General James C. Pfautz, USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Air Force
Washington, D.C. 20330

Dear Jim:

I appreciate the time you took recently to comment on the Directorate of Intelligence Research Program for 1985. Thank you also for your support of our "cross-cutting theme" approach. We believe this is a fruitful way to ensure that our research effort stays closely linked to key policy concerns.

I agree with your view that the potential for change in Eastern Europe is great. Believing that economic change might be the forerunner of political change, we have established a special working group to study the linkages between the Soviet and East European economies.

Concerning Marshal Ogarkov's statement last May, I agree that the Intelligence Community should pay close attention to Moscow's development and deployment of long-range, nonnuclear military systems. Although we all seem to agree that the Soviets are placing a high priority on developing such weapons for their forces opposite NATO, there seems less unanimity over the significance of this move. Our Office of Soviet Analysis does not interpret it as a major shift in Moscow's defense priorities. Nor does SOVA believe that an increased emphasis on conventional forces will necessarily come at the expense of nuclear weapons. We will strive to make certain that our research this year explores further this important topic.

Again, my thanks for your comments.

Sincerely,

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
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence

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Central Intelligence Agency

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Washington, D.C. 20505

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The Honorable Fred C. Ikle
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Fred:

Thank you for your thoughtful comments on the Directorate of Intelligence Research Program for 1985.

You expressed concern about Moscow's ability to mobilize the Soviet economy in time of war or crisis. I believe that some recent administrative steps plus the work we have planned for 1985 on Soviet military production will help shed light on this question. The Office of Soviet Analysis has recently:

- Assigned an analyst to work the "economic mobilization" account full time.
- Started to build an automated data base on Soviet industrial facilities.
- Inaugurated a series of studies on the modernization of various Soviet defense industries.
- Planned a study on the Soviet State material supply and reserves system.
- Worked with other Intelligence Community components to improve collection on key "economic mobilization" targets.

I share your concern about who would win a "mobilization" race, but as you know, CIA has no mandate to undertake "net assessments" involving the US.

I would note, apropos of your question about Soviet reconnaissance of the US, that SOVA is addressing a portion of this topic in an interagency study--now in the coordination process--entitled "Soviet Threat to Ground Mobile Strategic Systems in the Continental US." We will make every effort to get back to this line of study in the course of the year.

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Concerning Moscow's intelligence capability against NATO, I would draw your attention to a recently published Research Paper, "Soviet Use of Satellites To Support Ground and Air Reconnaissance Missions in a Central European Conflict," which I believe speaks directly to your question. I will send you a copy under separate cover.

As you note, the internal political situation in Vietnam must remain high on our list of priority concerns. I believe answers to some of the questions you raise will in fact start flowing from our research effort by the end of FY 1985. Exploratory projects on the books of the Office of East Asian Analysis hold considerable promise in this regard. To bolster its efforts on this line of research OEA has built a data base on Vietnamese personalities down to the district level and has recently shifted more analytical resources to the Vietnam account.

On Iran, we are indeed giving high priority to what happens post-Khomeini. A just-published Special National Intelligence Estimate, "Iran: The Post-Khomeini Era," and a soon-to-be-published Intelligence Assessment, "Iran: Growing Prospects for Instability," deal with this issue, and so will pending papers on Iran's foreign policy, Air Force, economy, and parliament.

Thanks again for your expression of interest in our Research Program.

Sincerely,



Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence

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